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THE PAST AND FUTURE OF ENGLISH INSURANCE
LAW: GOOD FAITH AND WARRANTIES
Peter MacDonald Eggers QC*
Abstract: This article reviews the current state of English insurance law applied to
the duty of utmost good faith, in particular the assured's duty of full and accurate
disclosure, and to insurance warranties, and examines the adequacy of the proposals
made by the Law Commission for the reform of the law in both instances. Whilst
recognising that there is a case for some reform, the reform recommended by the Law
Commission is considered to extend beyond the bounds of what is necessary for the
just and rational alteration of the law. In summary, the duty of utmost good faith
requires no substantive reform as to the existence or scope of the duty, but does
require a change by which the Courts will have the power to exercise a discretion to
achieve a flexible remedial response to any breach of the duty. The principal reform
which would benefit the law of warranties should concentrate on the clarity of the
language in which the warranty is expressed and to identify the circumstances in
which a true promissory warranty may be said to exist.
A. INTRODUCTION
Insurance contracts, and the body of law which has developed alongside
the making and operation of such contracts, may be considered unique.
Of course, they are a sub-species of contract and, it follows, that the
English law of contract applies to insurance contracts. However, they
have characteristics which no other contracts have. This is the inevitable
result of the nature and effect of insurance contracts.
An insurance contract has been defined as a contract by which one
party - the insurer - agrees to provide a benefit (usually, money) upon the
occurrence of an uncertain event in consideration for the counterparty's -
the assured's - promise to pay a premium (usually, money). This is such a
broad definition that it can encompass non-insurance transactions, in
particular gaming or betting contracts. However, there are further features
which serve to distinguish insurance contracts. There are in fact two types
of insurance contract, a contract of contingency insurance or a contract of
indemnity insurance. A contingency insurance contract is one by which
the insurer undertakes to pay a sum of money on a stated contingency (the
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insured peril), such as a specified sum on the death of or injury to the
assured. However, it is not everyone who may insure a person's life; only
those persons, such as relatives, who have a sufficient interest in the life
insured may take out such insurance. This is the requirement of an
insurable interest. By contrast, a betting transaction - for example, a bet
that if a horse wins a race, the bettor will receive a specified sum of
money - takes effect even if the person placing the bet has no interest in
the subject matter of the bet.
An indemnity insurance contract is one by which the insurer
promises to indemnify or compensate the assured for any loss suffered by
reason of the uncertain event (the insured peril). The requirement that the
assured suffer a loss is sufficient to mark an indemnity insurance contract
from a betting contract. Nevertheless, in addition to the requirement of a
loss, the law has also imposed a requirement of an insurable interest so
that only those persons who have a sufficient interest in or relationship
with the subject matter of the insurance may take out insurance in respect
of that subject matter (such as a car under a motor insurance contract or a
ship under a marine hull insurance policy).
Another way of characterising an insurance contract is to look at it as
an agreement by which an insurer agrees to bear, in whole or in part, the
risk of the uncertain event affecting the assured, which risk would
normally be borne by the assured. Accordingly, by reason of such a
contractual undertaking, the insurer voluntarily accepts that he or she will
step into the shoes, or at least into one of the shoes, of the assured in
specified circumstances. This is a remarkable feature, because most other
contracts do not require this transference of risk unless it forms a natural
consequence of the principal agreement between the parties. For example,
if a person agrees to hire a motor vehicle or charter an ocean-going vessel
from another person, there may be some circumstances where the hirer or
charterer agrees to bear certain risks which would normally reside with
the car- or ship-owner, but such agreements result from the hire or charter
arrangement. The very essence of the insurance contract is that it involves
this assignment of risk as the reason for the transaction.
Insurances are an inevitable feature of both domestic and
commercial life. Most people with a capacity to contract will have entered
into an insurance contract, even giving scant regard to the fact that such
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contracts have been concluded, when they have done so. For example,
many people have benefited from or taken out life insurance, medical
insurance, car insurance, travel insurance, and extended warranties over
consumer products. Given the vast volume of insurance transactions, it is
inevitable that the manner in which they are concluded are characterised
by two near-universal features. First, when the assured and the insurer
contract, the insurer is wholly reliant on the assured to provide
information relating to the subject matter of the insurance or the
circumstances of the assured to enable the insurer to evaluate the risk to
be assigned or insured. Secondly, the insurer will include provisions in
the insurance contract which are designed either to delineate the risks
which the insurer is or is not prepared to accept or which are designed to
impose obligations on the assured to provide information as to the nature
of the risk and/or to take certain steps to ensure that the risks being
insured are minimised.
It is these two characteristics which highlight two attributes of
insurance contracts peculiar to such contracts and which have resulted in
the evolution of a unique body of law. The two attributes are the parties'
mutual duties of utmost good faith and the operation of insurance
warranties in contracts of insurance. In many ways, these two attributes
are essential to help protect the insurer's position considering that in
many cases he is assuming responsibility for a risk otherwise borne by the
assured on the faith and credit of the information and promises granted by
the assured. Notwithstanding, these two attributes have developed in such
a way that, where the assured lapses in the provision of information or in
the promises he or she has made, there can be potentially harsh
consequences for the assured as far as the protection otherwise afforded
by the insurance contract is concerned. Such consequences may be harsh
where in particular the assured has acted innocently or where the effect of
such lapses is, as matters have turned out, trifling or minimal.
The potential harshness is such that over the past half-century, there
has been a growing call by judges and legislators for law reform. The
move towards law reform appears to be well underway, but it is by no
means complete. This article is intended to consider the current state of
the law and the current proposals for reform.
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B. THREE PIVOTAL EVENTS
English insurance law has a life of its own because insurance transactions
are an endemic feature of everyday domestic and commercial life. As
disputes invariably arise out of insurance transactions, because of the
large number of such transactions, the Courts have had to develop and
apply legal principles to each case. Parliament, however, has stepped in
occasionally to clarify and change the law. The progress of insurance law
in England is charted by three particular milestones, occurring in the latter
part of the 18th century, at the beginning of the 20th century, and at the
beginning of the 21st century.
1. Lord Mansfield
English insurance law has been developing organically, generally at the
hands of the Courts, for at least the past 250 years. In this sense, the law's
evolution has responded to changing economic conditions, advancing
technologies, and developing commercial practices and moral stances.
The start of this judicial process represents the first significant step in the
biography of English insurance law. Although insurance contracts had
been in existence in Europe since the renaissance and had taken root in
England in the 16th century, the law was for the first time bred, corralled,
broken and trained by the organising intellect of Lord Mansfield, who
was the Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1756 to 1788. He created
a principled platform for the development of English insurance law, in
particular for the duty of utmost good faith and warranties.I Indeed, he
has been described by Lord Eldon as 'the establisher, if not the author, of
a great part of this law'. 2 Indeed, in Lickbarrow v Mason (1787) 2 TR 63,
Buller, J said (at page 73) that Lord Mansfield 'may be truly said to be
the founder of the commercial law of this country'.
Thereafter, with Lord Mansfield's continuing influence, the common
law of insurance constructed a clear, but harsh, edifice on this platform. 3
See e.g. Ross v Bradshaw (1761) 1 Black W 312 (good faith and warranty);
Woolmer v Muilman (1763) 3 Burr 1418 (warranty); Hodgson v Richardson (1764)
1 Black W 463 (good faith); Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 (good faith).
2 Anderson v Pitcher (1800) 2 Bos & Pul 164, 168.
3 However, Edmund Burke said that Lord Mansfield 'sought to effect the amelioration
of the law by making its liberality keep pace with justice and the actual concerns of
the world ... confirming principles to the growth of commerce and our empire':
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It was easy to detect a punitive effect upon the assureds, because many
assureds approached insurance contracts with little real understanding of
the obligations upon them. On the other hand, there was a craving for
legal certainty. The history of commercial law may be seen as the
pitching of a balance between the two competing elements of fairness or
justice on the one hand and certainty on the other.4 In Wardle v Bethune
(1871) LR 4 PC 33, the Privy Council said (at page 59):
To use the language of Lord Mansfield as to a rule somewhat analogous, "At
first the rule appears to be hard, but it is settled on principles of policy, and,
when once established, every man contracts with reference to it, and there is
no hardship at all."
2. The Marine Insurance Act 1906
As the 19th century drew to a close, a passionate longing for codification
emerged. It is this drive towards a written, legislative statement of the law
which brings about the second pivotal event in the history of English
insurance law: Sir Mackenzie Chalmers's drafting of the Digest of
Marine Insurance Law and the statute which became the Marine
Insurance Act 1906.
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 was controversial when it was
before Parliament as a bill. The bill had been drafted by Sir Mackenzie
Chalmers, who was parliamentary counsel and later permanent under-
secretary of state of the Home department. Throughout its life, the bill
enjoyed the support of three successive Lord Chancellors. Despite
'mercantile opinion' in its favour, there were two waves of opposition to
the bill, namely a political obstacle and opposition from the legal
profession. At the turn of the 20th century, there was 'increasing
difficulty in passing any measure of law reform' (reportedly on account
Report from the Committee to inspect the Lords Journals, in relation to the
Proceedings on the Trial of Warren Hastings.
4 It is not dissimilar to the competing principles of liberty and security in the
philosophy of statecraft.
5 Barclay v Y Gana (1784) 3 Dougl 390.
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of 'one obstinate member'). 6 This political obstacle was finally
negotiated under the guidance of Lord Loreburn. The second obstacle
was the 'balance of legal opinion' against the bill. There was of course
solid support for the measure. There were however numerous specific
objections to the bill. There was also a larger objection rooted in
principle: that the law of England should not be reduced to a written
code. The support of the mercantile community was said to have rested
in the certainty of a law which was simply laid out in an act of
Parliament. The arguments marshalled against a codifying statute were
twofold. First, codification would lead to ossification and the law could
not be judicially developed to meet the justice of the case. Secondly, the
bill would inevitably omit important exceptions or would include
ambiguities.
In order to meet such opposition, Chalmers prepared a digest of the
principles of marine insurance law (1901), comprising a series of general
propositions of law based on the authorities, qualified by applicable
exceptions and instantiated by a number of illustrations. Chalmers then
exposed the digest to public review and criticism. Once the principles set
out in the digest were revised to meet legitimate criticism, the terms of
the digest could then be translated into the language of legislation. 8
Chalmers was committed to the view that the legal objections could be
reduced by careful draftsmanship, although he acknowledged that there
were bound to be 'ambiguities and small discrepancies and obscurities ...
which can only be cleared away by judicial interpretation.' 9
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 is described as 'An Act to codify
the Law relating to Marine Insurance'. Chalmers repeatedly emphasised
that the legislation that he drafted was an exercise in codification,
following the course of the 'wise lines laid down' by his mentor, Lord
Herschell. In his 1901 Digest of Marine Insurance, Chalmers identified
over 2,000 relevant authorities relating to marine insurance law. From
6 See generally the introduction to Digest of the Law of Marine Insurance (1st edn,
William Clowes and Sons Limited 1901); Mackenzie Chalmers, 'Codification of
Mercantile Law' (1903) 19 LQR 10, 14.
7 Alan Rodger, 'The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain' (1992)
108 LQR 570, 586-590.
8 Chalmers, 'Codification of Mercantile Law' (n 6) 11-14.
9 ibid 14-17.
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these authorities, Chalmers identified general principles of law.
Codification was to be of benefit in the enunciation of general principles
of law.' 0 A critical element of such codification is the use of concise and
clear language. Indeed, it is on this last score that Chalmers can perhaps
claim most credit. " It is for this reason that Chalmers's views have
remained influential in interpreting not only the 1906 Act but also the law
of marine insurance so much so that any statements of principle in the
Act are presumed to reflect the state of the law as it stood in 1906.12
Chalmers's influence is such that, in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v
Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501, a leading case on the duty
of the utmost good faith, Lord Mustill said (at page 542) that 'Sir
Mackenzie Chalmers was a most learned and careful scholar.'
It may be asked why the Marine Insurance Act 1906 is so important
to the development of insurance law generally. It is because many
principles of insurance law have developed from marine insurance law.
Moreover, the principles relating to the duty of utmost good faith and
warranties as set down in the 1906 Act have been held to be declaratory
of the common law of non-marine insurance, as much as marine
insurance. 13
3. The Law Commission Insurance Contract Project
In 2006, the Law Commission issued a joint scoping paper designed to
gauge professional and market opinion about the scope for reform of
insurance contract law. As part of this project, the Law Commission has
issued 9 Issues Papers and 3 Consultation Papers.14 The first Consultation
Paper in July 2007 was concerned with the duty of utmost good faith
(misrepresentation and non-disclosure) and warranties, both with respect
10 Mackenzie Chalmers, 'An Experiment in Codification' (1886) 2 LQR 125.
Soya GmbH v White [ 1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 136, 144; Merkur Island Shipping Corp
v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570, 594-595.
12 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [ 1995] 1 AC 501, 545,
570-571 (cf 529-530); Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Five Star Trading
LLC [2001] EWCA Civ 68; [2001] QB 825, [64]; The Mercandian Continent
[2001] EWCA Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 563, [21].
13 Consultation Paper No. 204, paras. 2.2, 12.2.
14 For the history of past efforts at the reform of the duty of utmost good faith, see
Peter MacDonald Eggers, Simon Picken and Patrick Foss, Good Faith and
Insurance Contracts (3rd edn, 2010 Informa), ch. 5.
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to consumer insurance and business insurance. Following that
Consultation Paper, it emerged that there was a wide-ranging consensus
for the reform of consumer insurance law and a lack of consensus for the
reform of business insurance law.
On 8th March 2012, following on the efforts of the Law
Commission, Parliament enacted the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure
and Representations) Act 2012. Although passed, the Act has not yet
entered into force and cannot do so before 8th March 2013. This piece of
legislation has fundamentally overhauled the duty of utmost good faith as
it had previously applied to consumer insurance contracts. Once the Act
becomes effective, the consumer assured will no longer be subject to a
duty of disclosure and will be responsible for misrepresentations only
where he or she has failed to exercise reasonable care, as judged by the
standards of a reasonable consumer. Under the Act, the remedies
available to the insurer will be depend on whether the assured acted
fraudulently, recklessly or carelessly and on the effect of any
misrepresentation on the judgment of the insurer.
The position with respect to business insurance contracts has been
more complicated. On 26th June 2012, the Law Commission issued its
third Consultation Paper (no. 204) principally dealing with the duty of
disclosure (and also misrepresentation) as applied to business insurance
contracts and warranties.15 The Law Commission envisages that it will
issue a final report later in 2012, with a proposed bill to follow during
2013. The proposals put forward by the Law Commission in its June
2012 Consultation Paper are considered below.
C. THE DUTY OF FULL AND ACCURATE DISCLOSURE
1. The Current Law
The pre-contractual duty of disclosure is the most significant part of the
duty of utmost good faith as applied in respect of insurance contracts. It
was given its first extensive exposition by Lord Mansfield in Carter v
Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905. In that case, Lord Mansfield presiding at
Guildhall over a disputed insurance claim held that the principle of good
15 A second Consultation Paper relating to the post-contractual duties and other issues
was published in December 2011 (Consultation Paper No. 201).
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faith applies to 'all contracts and dealings'. The duty of good faith
embraced two distinct components when considered in the presentation of
claims, namely the duty to make full disclosure of all material
circumstances and the duty not to make material misrepresentations. The
judgment given by the Lord Chief Justice was so influential that it can
find its analogue directly in the statutory codification of the law drafted
by Sir Mackenzie Chalmers in sections 18 and 20 of the Marine
Insurance Act 1906.
There are in fact four sections of the statute which set out the law of
the duty of the utmost good faith. Section 17 bears the marginal note or
heading that 'Insurance is uberrimae fidei', in other words that insurance
is of the utmost good faith. This is made explicit in the body of section 17
itself: 'A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost
good faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party,
the contract may be avoided by the other'. It has been queried whether
the duty should be described as being of 'good faith' or of 'the utmost
good faith' .16 The latter description is often viewed as arcane, apparently
of some ancient origin. In truth, it is a neologism of the early 19th
century.' 7 In should, however, be regarded as distinguishing the position
applying to ordinary contracts, where the duty of good faith requires all
parties to refrain from making misrepresentations. By contrast, the duty
of utmost good faith requires not only an abstinence from stating
untruths, but also the making of full disclosure.' 8
Section 18 sets out the assured's pre-contractual duty of disclosure
in the following terms:19
The assured must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every
material circumstance which is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed
to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to
be known by him.
16 See also Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 10.24.
17 In The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 AC 469, [44], Lord Hobhouse said that
the first recorded use of this term in 1850. However, the term was used earlier: see
Williams v Rawlinson (1825) 3 Bing 71, 77; Morrison v Muspratt (1827) 4 Bing 60,
62 (in argument); Rothschild v Brookman (1831) 2 Dow & Clark 188, 198;
Cornfoot v Fowke (1840) 6 M&W 358, 379.
18 Cf Newton v Chorlton (1853) 10 Hare 646, 649.
19 Sect. 18(1).
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The section proceeds to define what is material by reference to what
would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in deciding whether to
enter into the insurance contract.20 There are specified in the provision 4
exceptions to the duty of disclosure, namely information (a) which
diminishes the risk, (b) which is common knowledge or which is known
or ought to be known to the insurer, (c) the disclosure of which has been
waived by the insurer, and (d) the disclosure of which is superfluous by
reason of the existence of a warranty in the policy. 2 1
Section 19 sets out the duty of disclosure which applies personally to
the assured's agent (the broker) in placing or entering into the insurance
contract. Although the duty is borne by the agent, any failure to comply
with the duty does not automatically give rise to a remedy against the
agent by the insurer (in the absence of a cause of action in deceit or
negligence). 22 There is a further possible exception to the duty of
disclosure identified in section 19, under sub-section (b), in that where
the assured uses a broker to place the insurance, the assured and the
broker may be excused from disclosing a material circumstance, where
the information came to the assured's knowledge too late to communicate
it to the broker.
Section 20 provides that any representation made by the assured to
the insurer must be true or accurate. In particular, 'Every material
representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer during the
negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, must
be true'. The section defines materiality in a similar fashion to the
definition adopted in section 18.23 Section 20 distinguishes between
representations of fact on the one hand and representations of expectation
or belief on the other hand.2 4 A representation of fact is treated as true
where it is substantially true, in other words where the difference between
what is represented and what is true is not regarded as material to a
20 Sect. 18(2).
21 Sect. 18(3).
22 HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2000] 1
Lloyd's Rep 30, [100]-[105]; cfPryke v Gibbs Hartley Cooper Ltd [1991] 1 Lloyd's
Rep 602.
23 Sect. 20(2).
24 Sect. 20(3).
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prudent insurer.25 A representation of expectation and belief is true if it is
made in good faith, that is honestly.26 A representation of expectation or
belief is not regarded as untrue merely because the expectation is not
fulfilled or the belief is not justified or correct. If, however, the
expectation or belief as represented is not in fact entertained by the
assured and is fraudulently represented, there will be a
-27
misrepresentation.
There are similarities between establishing a breach of the duty of
utmost good faith by non-disclosure on the one hand and by
misrepresentation on the other hand, in particular the circumstances not
disclosed or misrepresented must be 'material' in the sense that they
'would have been taken into account by the underwriter when assessing
the risk' .28 This hypothetical underwriter concerned is an experienced,
rational, ordinary, prudent, intelligent, fair and reasonable person in the
29
position of the actual underwriter, 2 and his judgment must be 'governed
by the principles and calculations on which underwriters in practice
, 30
act'.
No breach of the duty will be established, in the case of a non-
disclosure or a misrepresentation, if the actual underwriter would not
have been induced by the breach. In other words, if full and accurate
disclosure had been made, and if the insurer would still have entered into
the contract of insurance on the same terms, the insurer will have no
remedy for the breach of the duty. On the other hand, if the insurer would
25 Sect. 20(4).
26 Sect. 20(5).
27 Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co plc [1998] QB 587; Rendall v
Combined Insurance Company of America [2005] EWHC 678 (Comm); [2006] 1
Lloyd's Rep IR 732, [103]; Kamidian v Holt [2008] EWHC 1483 (Comm); [2009]
Lloyd's Rep IR 242, [85]-[94], 138-141. It is possible that the assured's expectation
or belief is falsely represented by an innocent error: in such cases, there will be no
misrepresentation: see Limit No. 2 Limited v AXA Versicherung AG [2007] EWHC
2321 (Comm); [2008] Lloyd's Rep IR 330, [78]-[81]; [2008] EWCA Civ 1231;
[2009] Lloyd's Rep IR 396, [22]-[28].
28 Pan Atlantic Insurance Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501, 531, 538.
29 Stribley v Imperial Marine Insurance Company (1876) 1 QBD 507, 514-515; Tate
& Sons v Hyslop (1885) 15 QBD 368, 377; Associated Oil Carriers Limited v
Union Insurance Society of Canton Limited [ 1917] 2 KB 184.
30 lonides v Pender (1874) LR 9 QB 531, 539.
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not have entered into the contract at all, or would have entered into the
contract only on different terms (for example, subject to additional
exclusions or at a different premium), the insurer will have been induced
by the non-disclosure or misrepresentation and there will have been an
actionable breach of the duty of utmost good faith.3 1
The differences between the test of materiality and the requirement
of inducement are that in the former case the judgment of the prudent,
hypothetical underwriter is in issue and the impact on that judgment is a
relatively low threshold in that it need only be a matter which would enter
into the prudent underwriter's calculations, and no decisive impact need
be proved.32 In the latter case it is the judgment of the actual underwriter
which matters and the impact on his or her judgment must be decisive.
A critical element of establishing a material non-disclosure in breach
of the duty of utmost good faith is that the assured must have the requisite
degree of actual or deemed knowledge of the material circumstance. 3 3
There is no requirement of knowledge in order to establish a breach of
duty by misrepresentation in that the representation must be untrue,
whether or not it was known to be untrue.
In each case, there will be a breach of the duty of the utmost good
faith whether or not the assured acted fraudulently, negligently or entirely
without blame.34 Sections 17, 18 and 20 all state that the remedy for a
breach of the duty of the utmost good faith is the avoidance of the
insurance contract (with the consequent restitutionary remedies which
would arise upon a valid avoidance). The Courts have not allowed any
other remedy, in particular damages, for any breach of the duty of the
31 Pan Atlantic Insurance Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501;
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance Group (BSC) [2002] EWCA Civ
1642; [2003] Lloyd's Rep IR 131, [62], [78], [215]-[221]; Sugar Hut Group Ltd v
Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) plc [2010] EWHC 2636 (Comm); [2011] Lloyd's
Rep IR 198, [23]-[25].
32 Pan Atlantic Insurance Ltdv Pine Top Insurance Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501, 531.
33 It is also well arguable that an assured will have imputed to him or her the
knowledge of a relevant agent by the law of agency. However, note Group Josi
Reinsurance Co Ltd v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 345, 365-
366.
34 Whitlam v Hazel [2004] EWCA Civ 1600; [2005] Lloyd's Rep IR 168.
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utmost good faith, principally because no other remedy is specified in
sections 17-20 of the 1906 Act.35
Section 17 states the general duty of the utmost good faith. Sections
18-20 make detailed provision for the duty, but only in respect of the
assured's duty of full and accurate pre-contractual disclosure. However,
in his Marine Insurance Act 1906 (2nd ed., 1913), Sir Mackenzie
Chalmers made it clear that the provisions of sections 18-20 were not
exhaustive.3 6 The Marine Insurance Act 1906 is therefore silent in two
respects. First, no specific provision - other than the general reference in
section 17 - is made for the insurer's duty of utmost good faith. It is plain
that section 17 imposes a duty upon both the assured and the insurer in
that it provides that '... if the utmost good faith be not observed by either
party, the contract may be avoided by the other' (emphasis added). In
other words, the duty is mutual or reciprocal, binding both the assured
and the insurer.3 7 However, in most cases, as the assured comes to the
insurance transaction in possession of most of the information and the
insurer has comparatively little knowledge of the risk, the duty will be
borne by the assured more onerously.38
35 Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665;
[1991] 2 AC 249, 274; The Good Luck [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 238, 263. However,
damages may be available on other grounds, e.g. in deceit, for breach of a common
law duty of care, or under the Misrepresentation Act 1967.
36 The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2001] 2 WLR 170, [48].
37 Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1909-1910; Britton v Royal Insurance
Company (1866) 4 F&F 905, 909 ('on both sides'); Banque Financiare de la Citj v
Westgate Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 947, 960; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co
Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427, 456; The Star Sea
[2001] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 AC 469, [47]; James Park, A System of the Law of
Marine Insurances (8th edn, Saunders and Benning 1842), 403. See in the context
of the pre-contractual duty, Aldrich v Norwich Union Life Insurance Co Ltd [2000]
Lloyd's Rep IR 1.
38 Anderson v Pacific Fire and Marine Insurance Company (1872) LR 7 CP 65, 68;
Greenhill v Federal Insurance Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 65, 76; Banque Financidre de
la Cite v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd [1989] 2 All ER 952, 988; Pan Atlantic
Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 427, 447,
456; SocidteAnonyme d'Intermidiaires Luxembourgeois v Farex Gie [1995] LRLR
116, 149. Indeed, it has been suggested that this imbalance in the parties'
knowledge, coupled with the duty of disclosure, puts the assured in a weaker
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Secondly, no provision is made for the post-contractual duty of
utmost good faith. Since the late 19th century, it has been assumed that
the duty of utmost good faith applied after the contract was concluded. It
has been recognised that the pre-contractual duty revives when the
insurer has to exercise underwriting judgment, for example where the
contract of insurance is varied or amended. 39 However, even in the
absence of such cases, it was long considered that the duty of utmost
good faith applied to the performance of the contract, as much as to the
conclusion of the contract, particularly over the past 20 years. 4 0 The
difficulty is that section 17 of the 1906 Act does not explicitly state that
the duty of utmost good faith continues beyond the making of the
insurance contract and further does not define the scope of that duty. In
The Mercandian Continent [2001] EWCA Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd's
Rep 563, Longmore, U said (at paragraph 22(8)) that the draftsman of
the Act plainly intended that the duty applied after the contract was made.
In The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2001] 2 WLR 170, the House of
Lords was in fact reluctant to extend the duty of utmost good faith to
include post-contractual fraud, 41 but acknowledged that such a conclusion
was, in 2001, inevitable. In this case, the House of Lords held that any
post-contractual duty was limited to a duty to abstain from acting
fraudulently. Lord Hobhouse's judgment has been read as extending an
invitation to the Courts to find a way around the statutory remedy of
avoidance for post-contractual fraud. Mance, U in Agapitos v Agnew
[2002] EWCA Civ 247; [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 42, at paragraph 13,
position: R.A. Hasson, 'The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law - A
Critical Evaluation' (1969) 32 MLR 615, 633-634.
39 The Mercandian Continent [2001] EWCA Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 563,
[22].
40 The Good Luck [1990] 1 QB 818, 888; Bucks Printing Press Ltd v Prudential
Assurance Co [1994] 3 Re LR 219, 223; New Hampshire Insurance Company v
MGN Ltd [1997] LRLR 24, 48; Orakpo v Barclays Insurance Services [1995]
LRLR 443, 451, 452; Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1997] LRLR
523, 592, 600; Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd [ 1999] Lloyd's Rep
IR 209, 212-214, 214. See also D.R. Thomas, 'Fraudulent Insurance Claims:
Definition, Consequences and Limitations' [2006] LMCLQ 485, 512.
41 [6], [48], [72]; cf [106]. See also Howard Bennett, 'Mapping the doctrine of utmost
good faith in insurance contract law' [1999] LMCLQ 165; Bari Soyer, 'Continuing
duty of utmost good faith in insurance contracts: still alive?' [2003] LMCLQ 45.
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appealed to Parliament and the House of Lords to limit the duty of good
faith to the pre-contract stage. It nevertheless appears to be well
established that the duty of utmost good faith has a post-contractual
element. In The Mercandian Continent,42 Longmore, LJ did not consider
that it was open to the Court of Appeal to reach a different decision on
the continuing nature of the duty. This decision therefore confirms that
after the conclusion of the insurance contract, the parties owe each other a
duty not to be fraudulent in their performance of the contract or in their
dealings in connection with the contract.
2. The Law Commission's Proposals
In its recent Consultation Paper no. 204, published on 26th June 2012, the
Law Commission has focussed only on the assured's, and not the
insurer's, pre-contractual duty of disclosure and has made limited
suggestions with respect to the law relating to misrepresentation inducing
the conclusion of an insurance contract. The Law Commission already
addressed the assured's post-contractual duty (in particular, in respect of
claims) in its Consultation Paper no. 201 published in December 2011.
This article will concentrate on the proposals made in Consultation Paper
no. 204.
In its recent Consultation Paper, the Law Commission identified a
number of reasons which necessitate reform of the law. The Law
Commission believes that the duty of disclosure contributes to difficulties
perceived in the marketplace in the following ways:43
1. Policyholders do not understand the duty at least insofar as they
find it difficult to know what information the insurer requires to be
disclosed. The fact that many business assureds are being advised
by brokers - who it might be thought could provide professional
advice to the business assured as to the type of information
required to be disclosed - offers no solution, especially where
brokers' incomes have recently reduced, because 'Brokers have
therefore less time to devote to visiting and understanding the
client's business'.44
42 [2001] EWCA Civ 1275; [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 563, [34], [39]-[40].
43 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 4.53.
44 ibid para. 4.39.
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2. It is unclear whose knowledge within a large organisation is
relevant to that organisation's duty of disclosure.
3. Insurers have insufficient incentive to ask questions when
underwriting the risk.
4. The remedy for non-disclosure is unduly harsh.
With these considerations in mind, the Law Commission has put forward
its proposals for law reform.
(a) Materiality
The Law Commission recommends that the duty of disclosure set out in
section 18(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 be retained, but that the
concept of materiality should be clarified in legislation and that the
legislation should specify that (a) a material circumstance is a
circumstance required to provide a fair presentation of the risk and that
(b) a fair presentation should include (i) the disclosure of any unusual or
special circumstances which increase the risk, (ii) any particular concerns
about the risk which led the assured to seek the insurance, and (iii)
standard information which market participants generally understand
should be disclosed.4
One of the legitimate concerns with the current statutory test of
materiality is that it is based on the judgment of a reasonable person in
the position of the insurer and that the assured, who bears the brunt of the
duty of disclosure, is in the difficult position of trying to assess what a
reasonable person, not in the position of the assured, but in the position of
the insurer, would want disclosed. In reaction to this test, it had been
suggested in the past that a 'reasonable insured' test of materiality should
be introduced. However, the Law Commission correctly refers to the
uncertainties created by this test, because the large variety of assureds -
bearing in mind that assureds vary by reference to size, nationality,
business and governance - would necessarily result in varying boundaries
of the what would be regarded as material.4 6
45 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 5.72.
46 ibid para. 4.64-4.71.
226
UCL Journal ofLaw and Jurisprudence
The same concern would apply to any test of materiality which
defines the scope of the insurer's pre-contractual duty of disclosure. 4 7
Any test of materiality of information for disclosure by one party by
reference to the position of the other party will pose difficulties for the
former of foreshadowing what a reasonable person in the position of the
latter would want to take into account in determining whether or not to
enter into the contract.
When expert witnesses give evidence at trial on what information a
prudent insurer would consider as material, the debate is framed by
reference to what information would objectively and rationally relate to
the risk being assumed by the insurer. The test of a prudent insurer or a
reasonable assured can be dispensed with in favour of a simpler test
based on objective relevance of the information to the risk. In fact, there
is authority to indicate that such a test applies, as matters stand, in
addition to the prudent insurer test.48 Such a test has the benefit of being
simple to apply and of being concerned only with the risk associated with
the insurance transaction. For this purpose, 'risk' does not refer only to
the risk of an insured peril or loss or damage occurring, but instead the
risk of financial loss to the insurer under the transaction, thus allowing
information relating to subrogation to be taken into account.49
The Law Commission's proposals at first sight appear insufficient
because the general requirement that materiality be tested in light of what
is required for the purposes of a 'fair presentation of the risk' merely re-
defines materiality by a generalist abstraction. Further, the test of 'fair
presentation' in the past has been used to explain the relationship between
the duty of full disclosure interacting with the exception to the duty
which arises where the assured provides a summary and puts the insurer
47 As to the test of materiality applicable to the insurer's duty of disclosure, see
Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665,
772; [1991] 2 AC 249, 268, 281-282.
48 Glasgow Assurance Corp Ltd v Symondson & Co (1911) 16 Com Cas 109, 119-
120; Socidtd Anonyme d'Intermediaries Luxembourgeois v Farex Gie [1995] 2
Lloyd's Rep 116, 149; O'Kane v Jones [2003] EWHC 2158 (Comm); [2004] 1
Lloyd's Rep 389, [222]. See also Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General
Insurance Co Ltd [2003] HCA 25; (2003) 77 ALJR 1070, [32]-[33].
49 Socidtd Anonyme d'Intermediaries Luxembourgeois v Farex Gie [1995] 2 Lloyd's
Rep 116, 149.
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on inquiry of the existence of further information so that any failure on
the part of the insurer to require further disclosure results in a waiver of
such disclosure. 50 The Law Commission also proposes that the law
relating to waiver as currently understood by section 18 should be left as
it is.5 '
The Law Commission's proposals then proceed to limit the material
information to be disclosed by reference to information which 'increases'
the risk, without defining what the 'risk' entails, and ignores information
which may not increase the risk, but merely impinges on the nature or
character of the risk. Of course, under the current law, any information
which diminishes the risk need not be disclosed. The other two categories
of information which the Law Commission suggests should be included
in the duty of disclosure may be too limiting or may include information
which may not be truly material or relevant. Information relating to the
assured's concerns may or may not bear objectively on the risk and
information based on market understandings requires input of expert
evidence and is open-ended in its nature (as the Law Commission
recognises).52
Overall, the Law Commission's recommendations will achieve less
certainty than the current law and may in fact operate too artificially to
provide any real assistance in defining the scope of the duty of disclosure
which the Law Commission accepts should be retained as part of the law.
(b) The Assured's Knowledge
The Law Commission's proposals in respect of the knowledge
component of the assured's duty of disclosure appear to be no more than
a 'restatement of the law'. 5 3 To this end, its recommendations focus on
two aspects of knowledge: (a) who possesses the relevant knowledge
requiring disclosure, and (b) what type of knowledge is relevant. These
are both important questions, because either the law itself is not entirely
50 The Dora [ 1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 69, 88-89; Simner v New India Assurance Co Ltd
[ 1995] LRLR 240, 252; Newbury International Ltd v Reliance National Insurance
Co (UK) Ltd [ 1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep 83, 90; Svenska Handelsbanken v Sun Alliance
and London Insurance plc [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 519, 567.
51 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 5.76-5.77.
52 ibid para. 5.73-5.75.
53 ibid para. 6.73.
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clear or because the application of law to the facts in an individual case
may give rise to uncertainty. Although a restatement will assist on the
former question, it will not assist on the latter. However, the restatement
proposed by the Law Commission on the former question is no more than
an inclusive test, thus leaving much which falls outside the restatement
uncertain.
The Law Commission proposes that the persons who should have
the relevant knowledge should include the directing mind and will of an
organisation, where the assured is other than an individual, and the
persons who arranged the insurance on behalf of the organisation. This
restatement however provides little assistance, because it is already clear
that circumstances known to the directing mind and will, the placing
broker, and those within the insured organisation who arranged the
insurance, should be disclosed. 5 Indeed, section 19 of the Marine
Insurance Act 1906 imposes a personal duty of disclosure on the placing
broker, although it has been held that this statutory duty does not extend
to a producing or intermediate broker or a former broker of the assured.
The Law Commission makes a specific proposal for including within the
relevant class of persons who bears a duty of disclosure under section 19
not only the placing broker but also the producing or intermediate
broker. 56 Furthermore, the broker's knowledge is limited to that
information held by the broker in his or her capacity as the assured's
agent and does not extend to information which is held by the broker as
54 Group Josi Reinsurance Co Ltd v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd's
Rep 345, 366-367; Socidtd Anonyme d'Intermediaries Luxembourgeois v Farex Gie
[1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 116, 143, 150, 157.
ss Blackburn Low & Co v Vigors (1887) 12 App Cas 531; PCW Syndicates v PCW
Reinsurers [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 241, 258-259.
56 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 7.73. The Law Commission has raised the
question whether the exception in sect. 19(b) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906
should be retained (para. 7.77) suggesting that it is 'redundant'. However, that
provision does include an exception to the duty of disclosure where the assured is
possessed of material information prior to the time when the insurance contract is
concluded, but which the assured is unable to communicate to the broker prior to
the placing of the insurance.
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the agent of another person.57 The Law Commission has proposed that
this position should continue.
However, it is also clear that other persons' knowledge will be
relevant for the purposes of disclosure, including the knowledge of the
assured's general agents and those agents or employees who are
responsible for the general care and custody of the subject-matter of the
insurance (such as the master of a ship or the general manager of a
factory) .
The Law Commission also states that the types of knowledge
possessed by the assured which will define the scope of the duty of
disclosure will be the assured's actual knowledge, which would include
'blind eye' knowledge - that is where the assured would become aware of
a fact had he or she not wilfully shut his or her eyes to the fact 59 - and
'information that would have been discovered by reasonable enquiries,
which are proportionate to the type of insurance and to the size, nature
and complexity of the business'.60 There can be no dispute that actual
knowledge, including blind-eye knowledge, is relevant to the assured's
duty of disclosure, although actual knowledge must be such which is in
the mind of the assured at the time of making the insurance contract.
The difficulty with the 'reasonable enquiries' test is that on its face it
may have the effect of expanding the knowledge deemed to be possessed
by the assured. The current formulation of deemed knowledge under
section 18(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 is that '...the assured is
deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of
business, ought to be known by him...'. The phrase 'in the ordinary
course of business' has been defined by reference to the actual manner in
which the assured conducts its business, rather than the ordinary course
of business as would be conducted by a reasonable person in the
57 Socidtd Anonyme d'Intermediaries Luxembourgeois v Farex Gie [1995] 2 Lloyd's
Rep 116, 143, 150, 157; Group Josi Reinsurance Co Ltd v Walbrook Insurance Co
Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 345, 361, 367.
58 Blackburn Low & Co v Vigors (1887) 12 App Cas 531; Simner v New India
Assurance Co Ltd [1995] LRLR 240, 254-255.
59 Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co plc [ 1998] QB 587, 601-602, 607.
60 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 6.75-6.78.
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assured's position.6 1 The test put forward by the Law Commission may
well impose a more stringent requirement on the assured to make
reasonable enquiries, at least where reasonableness is assessed by
reference to the industry as a whole, although the Law Commission notes
that the 'test should accept that not all companies are perfectly run'. 62
The open issue however which is not considered by the Law
Commission, and which requires attention, is whether the knowledge of
an agent is automatically to be imputed to the assured pursuant to the law
of agency or whether such knowledge can be attributed only if it would
have been communicated to the assured in the ordinary course of
business. 6 3
(c) The Insurer's Knowledge
The Law Commission also focuses on the boundaries of the insurer's
knowledge insofar as it constitutes an exception to the assured's duty of
pre-contractual disclosure as set out in section 18(3)(b) of the Marine
64Insurance Act 1906. In this respect, the Law Commission does not
propose any alterations to the current state of the law. For example, it
states that matters of actual, common or deemed knowledge should be
included in this exception. The most difficult aspect of this exception is
the insurer's deemed knowledge, knowledge which a well-informed
underwriter ought to have. In this respect, the Law Commission refers to
matters which the insurer ought to have based on the practices and risks
of the insured trade. This however is already plainly encompassed in the
current formulation of the exception ('matters which an insurer in the
ordinary course of his business, as such, ought to know') which includes
61 Australia & New Zealand Bank v Colonial & Eagle Wharves Ltd [1960] 2 Lloyd's
Rep 241, 252; Simner v New India Assurance Co Ltd [1995] LRLR 240, 253-255;
ERC Frankona Reinsurance v American National Insurance Co [2005] EWHC
1381 (Comm); [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep IR 157, [173].
62 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 6.77.
63 In Group Josi Reinsurance Co Ltd v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [ 1996] 1 Lloyd's
Rep 345, 365-366, the Court of Appeal held that it was so limited. However, this
ignores the law of agency.
64 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 8.42-8.50.
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the 'normal risks' associated with the insured activity, but not 'unusual
risks'. 65
In addition, the Law Commission states that information held by the
insurer's agent or employee which ought to have been communicated to
the underwriter should form part of the exception. This is problematic.
The Law Commission recognises that the knowledge relevant to this
exception is the knowledge held by the underwriter - the person making
the underwriting decision - and the directing mind and will of the insurer
(insofar as the insurer is not an individual). However, the real question is
the extent to which information held by large corporate insurers should be
treated as falling within the exception. For example, the question arises
whether the exception extends to information which is not actually
known to the underwriter but which is known to (a) members of the
underwriter's team, (b) other employees of the underwriter's department,
(c) employees of other, but closely associated, departments, (d)
employees of other, more distant departments (e.g. those departments
which are located in different cities), and (e) external databases or
agencies whom the underwriter could consult. At present, although this
may be disputed, it appears that the law does not require the assured to
disclose information which could be retrieved by the insurer if the insurer
complied with that particular insurer's usual business practices. 6 6 If, for
example, the insurer upon receiving a proposal for a risk would as a
matter of that insurer's usual course of business check a particular
internal or external computer database, any information which would
have been retrieved upon such a search would be deemed to be known to
the insurer, whether or not the insurer in fact undertook that search.
The danger with the Law Commission's current proposals is that it
seeks to restate the law in terms different to the current statutory
language, which has benefited from a continuing process of judicial
interpretation, which construction might be dispensed with if the
language of the statute were to change. There can be value in such a
65 North British Fishing Boat Insurance Co Ltd v Starr (1922) 13 Li L Rep 206, 210;
Greenhill v Federal Insurance Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 65; Marc Rich & Co AG v
Portman [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 430, 442; aff'd [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 225.
66 Bates v Hewitt (1867) LR 2 QB 595; London General Insurance Company v
General Marine Underwriters' Association [1921] 1 KB 104, 111, 112; Malhi v
Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd [1996] LRLR 237.
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statutory exercise only if it were intended to alter the law or clarify a
genuinely uncertain area of the law. None of the Law Commission's
proposals appear to achieve this object.
(d) Knowledge and Misrepresentation
Finally, on the question of knowledge, the Law Commission has
proposed that the same requirements of knowledge should be applied to
both section 18 (non-disclosure) and section 20 (misrepresentation) of the
Marine Insurance Act 1906.67 This is a difficult recommendation to
understand. There is no requirement of knowledge in order to prove a
misrepresentation, except possibly in one limited context. There is a
distinction drawn in section 20 between representations of fact (which
can constitute a breach of the duty of utmost good faith whether the
representation was or was not known to be untrue) and representations of
expectation and belief which are deemed to be untrue only if they are
made fraudulently - in this sense, they have a requirement of knowledge
in that they are untrue only if the assured knows that the representation of
expectation or belief - i.e. of the assured's state of mind which the
assured is in a unique position to assess - is untrue.
The Law Commission's desire to apply a requirement of knowledge
to these two distinct kinds of breach is based on an apparent
misconception. The relevance of knowledge to an actionable non-
disclosure and to an actionable misrepresentation is in fact different. In
the former case, it is the knowledge - actual or deemed knowledge - of
the material circumstance which gives rise to the duty of disclosure. 6 8 In
the latter case of a misrepresentation, the assured's knowledge is
technically irrelevant. It is certainly irrelevant to the case of a
misrepresentation of fact. If the assured's representation is material and
induces the insurer to enter into the insurance contract, it will permit the
insurer to avoid the contract. Whether or not the assured is aware or
ought to be aware that the representation is false is irrelevant to the
insurer's entitlement to avoid. The position is the same with respect to the
ordinary law of misrepresentation in that any innocent misrepresentation
gives rise to an equitable right on the part of the representee to rescind the
67 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 6.91-6.95.
68 Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Company [1908] 2 KB 863, 884-885.
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contract induced by the misrepresentation. If the Law Commission's
proposals were carried forward, it would create a sizeable gulf between
the law applicable to insurance contracts and the law applicable to
ordinary contracts, without any sensible grounds for the distinction.
Furthermore, the association of the concept of knowledge to a
misrepresentation of an expectation or belief is to ignore the real nature
of such a misrepresentation. Knowledge becomes important in this
respect because the representation made by the assured is not of an
objectively determinable external fact, but of the state of the assured's
mind, and such a representation must necessarily be associated with the
assured's state of knowledge, not because it is implicit in the elements of
an actionable misrepresentation but because it is inherent in the nature of
the representation; in other words, the representation is as to what the
assured expects or believes. 69
(e) Remedies
The area of the law deserving the greatest measure of criticism concerns
the remedies available for a breach of the duty of the utmost good faith.
In fact, it is the remedy, not the duty itself, which requires reform. The
Marine Insurance Act 1906 identifies only one remedy, namely that of
avoidance. The Court of Appeal has construed the statute as excluding all
other possible remedies, in particular damages.70 This has caused a real
difficulty and a genuine injustice in that:7 '
1. In most cases, the party in breach will be the assured, not the
insurer. The remedy is essentially one-sided.
69 Representations of opinion are treated in the same way as representations of
expectation and belief: Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co plc [ 1998]
QB 587. Oddly, it has been held that a representation of intention is not such a
representation (St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co (UK) Ltd v McConnell Dowell
Constructors Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 116, 127; Limit No. 2 Limited v AXA
Versicherung AG [2007] EWHC 2321 (Comm); [2008] Lloyd's Rep IR 330, [46];
[2008] EWCA Civ 1231; [2009] Lloyd's Rep IR 396, [17]-[18]).
70 Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 QB 665;
[1991] 2 AC 249, 274; The Good Luck [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 238, 263.
7' The Star Sea [2001] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 AC 469, [57]; D.R. Thomas (ed.), Marine
Insurance: The Law in Transition (Informa 2006), para. 3.40-3.50.
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2. Avoidance is an 'all or nothing' remedy so that the insurer has no
choice, in the face of a breach, but to avoid or to affirm the
insurance contract.
3. Avoidance is seldom a desirable remedy from the assured's
perspective in that the assured will in most, but not all, cases wish
to maintain rather than set aside the insurance contract.
4. The remedy is available for all breaches, irrespective of the
magnitude of the breach, the distorting effect on the insurer's
assessment of the risk as presented, and the blameworthiness of the
assured's breach.
Accordingly, there is a palpable flaw in the law, as enshrined by statute
and judicial construction of that statute, which requires attention by the
legislature. Recent judicial unease with the state of the law has induced
the Courts to temper the remedies available for a breach of the post-
contractual duty,7 2 recognising that reforming the remedies for a breach
of the pre-contractual duty is beyond the power of the Courts.
The Law Commission has, by its proposals, sought to tailor the
remedy of avoidance to operate as both a punitive provision (in the case
of fraud) and a qualified compensation provision. It proposes that (a) if
the assured has acted fraudulently in not making full and accurate
disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract and retain the premium, (b)
if the assured has acted other than fraudulently, and (i) if the insurer
would not have entered into the contract at all had full and accurate
disclosure been made, the insurer may avoid the contract, (ii) if the
insurer would not have entered into the contract on the same terms (other
than as to premium) had full and accurate disclosure been made, the
contract is to be treated as if it included those terms, and (iii) if the
insurer would have entered into the contract on the same terms but at a
higher premium had full and accurate disclosure been made, the amount
72 Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) [2002] EWCA Civ 247; [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 42;
Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb [2005] EWCA Civ 112; [2005] Lloyd's Rep
IR 369. The first case dealt with the issue of forfeiture and avoidance obiter; the
second case was a case where the insurer did not seek to avoid the insurance
contract.
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to be paid on a claim under the insurance contract is to be reduced
proportionately, and (c) where the insurer is entitled to apply such
remedies, the insurer should be entitled to cancel the insurance contract
for the future.7 3
These proposals are plainly well considered and are defensible in
any rational discussion. They are not, however, immune from criticism.
First, there is no provision for a discretion which takes account of all
relevant circumstances. For example, a minor breach of the duty may be
fraudulently motivated but have a relatively inconsequential effect on the
insurer's decision-making. On the other hand, a very serious lapse in
disclosure may distort the risk substantially even though the breach was
inadvertent. The Courts are able to exercise a discretion under the
Misrepresentation Act 1967 at least where the misrepresentation is non-
fraudulent.74 Secondly, compensation provisions are well and good, but
they ignore the fact that the insurer's consent to the insurance contract
was vitiated by the non-disclosure or misrepresentation and avoidance is
the orthodox and appropriate remedy in all non-insurance cases at least
where there has been a misrepresentation. If it were thought that there
may be cases where compensation will achieve the desired end, the
Courts exercise a relevant discretion to override the avoidance and
substitute a damages remedy (as is the case under the Misrepresentation
Act 1967). Thirdly, a right of cancellation will seldom be useful in that in
most cases the breach of the duty of utmost good faith will be discovered
only after the insurance contract has run its course, at which point
cancellation will provide little assistance.
Notwithstanding such criticisms, the current proposals make sense,
but they do not go far enough to cater for all potential injustices and to
ensure consistency with the ordinary law of misrepresentation.
73 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 9.28-9.40, 9.60-9.62, 9.63-9.76.
74 In Highlands Insurance Co v Continental Insurance Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 109,
117-118, Steyn, J held that the Courts should not exercise any discretion under the
1967 Act to disallow avoidance for breach of the duty of utmost good faith. See
also HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2001]
EWCA Civ 1250; [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 483, [51], [116].
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D. WARRANTIES
1. The Current Law
Insurance warranties are different from terms found in ordinary contracts
not as regards the nature of the promise encompassed by the warranty but
as regards the consequences of a breach of the warranty. Under an
ordinary contract, a breach of a contractual term will either result in the
innocent party being entitled to terminate the contract prospectively (if
the breach is sufficiently serious) and/or to claim damages for losses
caused by the breach.
Breaches of a promissory warranty under an insurance contract
result in the automatic discharge of the insurer from liability, because the
warranty is relevant to the nature and scope of the risk which the insurer
has agreed to bear by reason of the insurance transaction. The law of
insurance warranties is set out in sections 33-35 of the Marine Insurance
Act 1906 which are generally regarded as declaring the law applicable to
* * 75
non-marine insurance contracts as well as marine insurance contracts.
Section 33(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 defines a warranty as:
a promissory warranty, that is to say, a warranty by which the assured
undertakes that some particular thing shall or shall not be done, or that some
condition shall be fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of
a particular state of facts.
Warranties may be express or implied. Under section 35(1), an 'express
warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to
warrant is to be inferred'. Under section 35(2), an 'express warranty must
be included in, or written upon, the policy, or must be contained in some
document incorporated by reference into the policy.' It is therefore
essential that an express warranty be included or written upon the policy
or incorporated by a reference in the policy. The warranty or reference
may be found anywhere in writing in the policy. 76
Most, if not all, implied warranties apply as a matter of law by
reason of the Marine Insurance Act 1906,77 unless they are inconsistent
7 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 12.2.
76 See e.g. Blackhurst v Cockell (1789) 3 TR 360.
7 Sect. 39 (seaworthiness) and 41 (legality).
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with the terms of the contract, or with an express warranty.79 It is
conceivable, although unlikely, that there may be a warranty implied by
reason of the parties' agreement (i.e. by which the intention to warrant is
inferred).so. It is to be noted that under section 35(3), 'An express
warranty does not exclude an implied warranty, unless it be inconsistent
therewith.'
Under section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, a promissory
'warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly
complied with, whether it be material to the risk or not.' As will be
observed below, however, the materiality of the warranty to the risk has
become a hallmark feature of a true promissory warranty. If there has
been any departure from a warranty, no matter how slight (except
possibly if the departure is de minimis), there has been a breach of
warranty. 82 The consequences of a breach of a promissory warranty may
be summarised as follows (subject to the terms of the warranty or the
policy). Immediately upon the breach of warranty, the insurer will be
discharged automatically from liability as from the date of the breach,
whether or not the insurer is aware of the breach, and the insurer remains
liable for any losses incurred by him before the date of the breach of
warranty. 8 3 The fact that the breach of warranty ceases or is remedied
after the initial breach does not result in the insurer coming on risk
again.84 The breach need have no causative connection with any loss
which is the subject of a claim under the contract or with the risk being
insured.85
78 Sect. 87.
79 Sect. 35(3).
80 Sect. 33(2).
81 HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [2001]
EWCA Civ 735; [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 161.
82 De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 TR 343; Union Insurance Society of Canton v George
Wills & Co [ 1916] AC 281; Sugar Hut Group Ltd v Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK)
plc [2010] EWHC 2636 (Comm); [2011] Lloyd's Rep IR 198, [44].
83 Sect. 33(3); Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd
(The Good Luck) [1992] 1 AC 233; The Buana Dua [2011] EWHC 2413 (Comm);
[2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep 655, [38]-[41].
84 Sect. 34(2).
8 5 De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 TR 343; Foley v Tabor (1861) 2 F&F 663;
Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher [1989] AC 852.
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Because of these consequences, the Courts have found ways of
ameliorating the effect of promissory warranties. First, the Courts will
construe any ambiguities in the wording of a warranty or any other term,
such as conditions precedent, on which the insurer seeks to rely in order
to reduce or extinguish its liability, strictly against the insurer. 86
Secondly, the Courts have tended to construe terms described as
warranties as suspensive or descriptive warranties where the term is less
important or fundamental to the risk being insured. If the provision
relates to the very essence of the risk or goes to the root of the
transaction, it is more likely to be a promissory warranty. 87 If, for
example, the failure to comply with the provision would mean that the
risk being insured has increased, even after the breach ceases, it is more
likely that the provision is a promissory warranty.88 If the warranty is
construed as a suspensive or descriptive provision, there will be no cover
under the policy whilst the breach remains in existence but once the
breach is remedied, the cover afforded by the policy will be reinstated.
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 identifies 3 defences to an
allegation of breach of warranty: (1) Non-compliance with a warranty is
excused when, by reason of a change of circumstances, the warranty
ceases to be applicable to the circumstances of the contract;8 9 (2) Non-
compliance with a warranty is excused when compliance with the
86 The Zeus V [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 587, [30]; George Hunt Cranes Ltd v Scottish
Boiler and General Insurance Co Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1964; [2002] Lloyd's Rep
IR 178; Pratt v Aigaion Insurance Company SA [2008] EWCA Civ 1314; [2009] 1
Lloyd's Rep 225.
87 Barnard v Faber [1893] 1 QB 340; Beauchamp v National Mutual Indemnity Ins
Co Ltd (1937) 57 Ll L Rep 272, 275; The Bamcell I [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 528 (Sup
Ct Canada); Svenska Handelsbanken v Sun Alliance and London Insurance plc
[1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 519, 551-553; Sugar Hut Group Ltd v Great Lakes
Reinsurance (UK) plc [2010] EWHC 2636 (Comm); [2011] Lloyd's Rep IR 198,
[40]-[54].
88 De Maurier (Jewels) Ltd v Bastion Insurance Co Ltd [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep 550,
558-559.
89 Sect. 34(1); cf Agapitos Laiki Bank (Hellas) SA v Agnew (No 2) [2002] EWHC
1558 (Comm); [2003] Lloyd's Rep IR 54, [59]; Sugar Hut Group Ltd v Great Lakes
Reinsurance (UK) plc [2010] EWHC 2636 (Comm); [2011] Lloyd's Rep IR 198,
[42].
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warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent law; 90 (3) A breach of
warranty may be waived by the insurer.91 The Courts have held that a
breach of warranty may be waived by the insurer only by promissory
estoppel and not by election,92 even though there was no doctrine of
promissory estoppel when the Marine Insurance Act 1906 was passed and
even though other references to waiver in the Act (sections 18(3)(b) and
62(8)) have not been so construed.
2. The Law Commission's Proposals
The effect of warranties has attracted a great deal of criticism,93 in that
they can operate harshly. 94 Against the background of such criticism, the
Law Commission proposes that:9 5
1. All warranties operate as suspensive warranties in that any breach
will result in the insurer's liability being suspended only whilst the
breach remains unremedied.
2. Where the warranty is designed to reduce the risk of a particular
loss, a breach of the warranty suspends the insurer's liability only
in respect of that type of loss.
3. Warranties of existing facts should be abolished.
4. The parties cannot contract out of the statutory regime at all in
respect of consumer insurance and the parties can contract out of
the statutory regime in respect of business insurance only if the
90 Sect 34(1).
9' Sect. 34(3).
92 Brownsville Holdings Ltd v Adamjee Insurance Co Ltd (The Milasan) [2000] 2
Lloyd's Rep 458, 467; HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Axa Corporate
Solutions [2002] Lloyd's Rep IR 325; affd [2002] EWCA Civ 1253; [2003] Lloyd's
Rep IR 1.
93 Andrew Longmore, 'Good faith and breach of warranty: are we moving forwards or
backwards?' [2004] LMCLQ 158, 164; Malcolm Clarke, 'Insurance Warranties:
The Absolute End?' [2007] LMCLQ 474.
94 Kler Knitwear Ltd v Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd [2000] Lloyd's Rep IR 47,
49.
95 Consultation Paper No. 204, para. 15.1, 15.9-15.13, 15.14-15.17, 15.26-15.29,
15.35-15.39, 15.54-15.59.
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warranty is written in clear, unambiguous language and is
specifically brought to the attention of the other party when the
contract is concluded.
5. The defences to a breach of warranty set out in sections 34(1) and
(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 should be retained.
There is much to be said for the view that true promissory warranties
which can operate so powerfully must be evidenced by clear and
unambiguous language and that they be specifically highlighted rather
than hidden amongst standard terms. Furthermore, as insurance
warranties can have devastating consequences for a consumer assured,
the Law Commission's proposals have much to commend them.
The position with respect to business insurance is more difficult.
One must recall that many business assureds are themselves sophisticated
companies operating on the basis of standard terms which are
incorporated into their contracts. Furthermore, many business assureds
will benefit from the advice of professional insurance brokers.
Promissory warranties can serve an important function in that the
insurer agrees to bear a risk of loss which would ordinarily be borne by
the assured but only on condition that the assured takes steps which are
aimed at fundamentally affecting the risk which the insurer is assuming.
The proposals put forward by the Law Commission will operate fairly in
many cases, but there are two particular cases where they may provide
insufficient protection to the insurer.
First, the insurer may be prejudiced where the breach of warranty
has a continuing effect even after it has been remedied. For example, the
assured may warrant that the insured vessel will not call into a specific
blacklisted port. Of course while the vessel is at the blacklisted port, the
cover will be suspended according to the Law Commission's proposals.
However, once the vessel leaves the port and the breach is remedied, the
cover is reinstated. This may operate unfairly to the insurer where the
character or degree of the risk changes as a result of the breach, even after
the breach ceases. Taking the example, after the ship leaves the
blacklisted port, the risks of an attack on the vessel may increase because
the ship will itself be tainted by the blacklist.
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Second, the insurer may be prejudiced where the breach of warranty
has facilitated the consequent loss, even though when the loss occurs the
breach has been remedied. This has been highlighted recently in piracy
cases. In many insurance policies, the assured is subject to a warranty to
take self-protective measures to reduce the risk of a piratical attack (such
as operating the insured vessel at a minimum high speed or avoiding
certain areas). If, therefore, a ship breaches the warranty by proceeding
too slowly or by entering an excluded zone, that breach may have
allowed pirates to attack and board the insured vessel, even though at the
time of the attack, the breach has been remedied.
The Law Commission's recommendation to abolish existing fact
warranties, namely warranties by which a state of affairs is warranted to
exist or not to exist, is slightly puzzling in that the Law Commission's
proposals suggests that existing fact warranties operate more harshly than
future or continuing warranties, that is warranties which impose a future
or continuing obligation on the assured. It is puzzling because the assured
is in a much better position to check the accuracy of the warranted
statement and to avoid a breach than in dealing with compliance with
future and continuing obligations. Certainly, there was a time when
continuing warranties were regarded as operating more harshly. 96
Furthermore, many commercial contracts are often expressed to be
conditional on the truth of warranted statements. It is difficult to
understand why a warranted statement of an existing fact is so
objectionable. The real objection is the fact that a certain species of an
existing fact warranty - the 'basis' clause - is introduced into the contract
of insurance by insidious means. Such provisions render a statement of
existing fact as a warranty by means only of a provision that the
statement forms the 'basis' of or is incorporated into the contract of
96 Thomson v Weems (1884) 9 App Cas 671, 684; Yorkshire Insurance Company
Limited v Campbell [1917] AC 218, 224; Hussain v Brown [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep
627; Kler Knitwear Ltd v Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd [2000] Lloyd's Rep
IR 47. Cf Cornhill Insurance plc v DE Stamp Felt Roofing Contractors Ltd [2002]
EWCA Civ 395; [2002] Lloyd's Rep IR 648, [20]; The Game Boy [2004] EWHC 15
(Comm); [2004] 1 Lloyd's Rep 238, [137]-[139].
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insurance. 9 7 If, however, there is a requirement introduced by legislation
that such provisions should operate as warranties only upon the clearest
and most unambiguous language specifically highlighted in the contract,
this objection evaporates.
The Law Commission's proposals do not necessarily touch these
concerns and should do so before the law is altered. 98 That said, the
contracting-out mechanism proposed by the Law Commission may well
provide an adequate solution to this issue.
E. CONCLUSION
For the past 250 years, English insurance law has developed arguments,
commentary, and judgments which make up the common law. There is
much in the law concerning the duty of utmost good faith which requires
maintenance. Such maintenance does not mean that the law need to be
replaced. It means those areas which are productive of the greatest
injustice must be changed and those areas of the law which serve a
commercial purpose should be retained. The most pressing issue relating
to the duty of utmost good faith is not the existence or content of the duty
itself, but the remedies for the breach of such a duty.
As the duty of utmost good faith is a reciprocal duty, binding on
both the insurer and the assured alike, it would be unwise to reform the
law insofar as it bears on the assured's pre-contractual duty of disclosure
without regard to the consequences of a breach of the insurer's own duty
of disclosure. In the short term, greater flexibility in the grant of remedies
for a breach which can take account of the seriousness of the breach or
the consequences of the breach and the blameworthiness of the assured's
(and the insurer's) conduct are matters which should be taken into
account in providing a remedy. This will inevitably involve the use of a
judicial discretion, matching that which the Courts may exercise in the
97 Thomson v Weems (1884) 9 App Cas 671; Dawsons v Bonnin [1922] 2 AC 413;
Kumar v AGF Insurance Ltd [1999] Lloyd's Rep IR 147; Zeller v British
Caymanian Insurance Co Ltd [2008] UKPC 4; [2008] Lloyd's Rep IR 545.
98 The proposals are also put forward to apply to the implied warranties of
seaworthiness and legality under the Marine Insurance Act 1906: Consultation
Paper No. 204, para. 16.11-16.18.
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context of non-fraudulent misrepresentations made by a contracting party
to another contracting party under the Misrepresentation Act 1967.
Any approach to the law concerning insurance warranties must be
similarly circumspect. The harshness of a breach of warranty often
ignores the fact that the true promissory warranty performs a vital
function as far as the insurer is concerned and often the insurance
protection offered by an insurance policy is conditional on such
warranties being observed by the assured. To restrict the scope of such
warranties does interfere with the parties' contractual freedom. That is
not to say that such warranties cannot benefit from legislation requiring
warranties to be expressed in clear and unambiguous terms, to be brought
specifically to the attention of the assured, and to be construed as
suspensive provisions if they are in reality not of fundamental importance
to the risk being insured. In such cases, the law should adopt a strict
approach to promissory warranties, but the common law appears to have
developed to that end in any event.
Law reform is a critical feature of the just and rational development
of any body of law, not least the English law of insurance. Reformist
passion however must be constrained to provide assistance only where
the Courts are unwilling or unable to act to evolve the common law to
achieve such just and rational objectives.
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